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Commercial Law
by Robert A. Weber, Jr.*
This year's survey article attempts a synthesis of case law subdivided
according to various aspects of a commercial practice. Topics discussed
include banking/lender issues, collections, sales of businesses, pitfalls on
the front end of a commercial transaction, and a miscellaneous catchall
for cases that stubbornly defy categorization.

I. BANK/LENDER ISSUES
A.

Account Management

Several cases addressed account management issues during the survey
period. In Emmett v. Regions Bank,1 the court of appeals confronted a
fact scenario that is sadly all too familiar. Husband and wife had a joint
savings account and two certificates of deposit ("CDs") titled jointly in
their names. In June 1996, wife was admitted to a nursing home. On
June 17, 1996, husband and his daughter from a previous marriage went
to defendant bank and transferred the funds from the savings account
and CDs into the joint names of husband and daughter. Four days later,
daughter transferred these funds into her name alone, and husband died
shortly thereafter on June 24, 1996. Wife died on August 26, 1996, and
the executors of the estates of husband and wife sued defendant bank,
claiming it had improperly permitted these transactions.

* Associate in the firm of Smith, Gilliam, Williams & Miles, Gainesville, Georgia.
Mercer University (B.A., 1991; J.D., cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (19921994); Editor in Chief (1993-1994). Member, State Bar of Georgia. Law Clerk to the
Honorable Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of
Georgia (1994-1996).
As with last year's article, many thanks to my wife, Laurie, for all her support.
1. 238 Ga. App. 455, 518 S.E.2d 472 (1999).
2. Id. at 455-56, 518 S.E.2d at 473-74.
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In particular, plaintiff executors challenged whether the transaction
was authorized.
In response to plaintiffs' request for production,
defendant showed it could not locate or did not have certain requested
items, such as the memorandum showing the savings account withdrawal. Defendant did submit, however, affidavits of its vice president
concerning the history of both the savings account and CDs; an affidavit
by a teller that the CDs were jointly owned by husband and wife; and an
affidavit by the teller who conducted the June 17, 1996 transaction.3
Plaintiff asserted the trial court erred in several respects in granting
summary judgment to defendant. First, plaintiff argued the affidavits
of defendants' employees should have been stricken because the best
evidence was the CDs and debit memos showing the withdrawals. 4 The
appellate court found the best evidence rule did not apply as the written
documents in question were merely collateral or incidental to the issue
of authorization. 5
Second, plaintiff cited several statutes regarding records retention by
financial institutions, apparently suggesting that defendant would be
estopped from submitting affidavits because of its inability to produce
these records. Plaintiff cited section 7-1-910 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A."),6 which requires banks to retain certain
documents.7 The court held this code section was not applicable to the
transaction at issue as it pertains only to current transactions.8
However, O.C.G.A. section 7-1-63(c) specifically permits introduction of
legible products of computer operations, which the bank submitted, as
a record of a transaction.9 The federal statutes cited by plaintiff were
also inapplicable. The court found that "12 U.S.C. § 1829b, which
provides that where the Secretary of the United States Treasury
determines that maintaining records is useful for criminal, tax, or
regulatory proceedings, he shall prescribe regulations to carry out those
purposes," is silent on financial institution retention of CDs or
withdrawal slips.' ° Another federal statute cited by plaintiff, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1730d," had been repealed. 2

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 459, 518 S.E.2d at 476.
Id. at 457, 518 S.E.2d at 475.
Id. at 458, 518 S.E.2d at 475.
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-910 (1997).
238 Ga. App. at 458, 518 S.E.2d at 475.
Id. (construing O.C.G.A. § 7-1-910).
Id., 518 S.E.2d at 475-76 (construing O.C.G.A. § 7-1-63(c) (1997)).
Id., 518 S.E.2d at 476 (construing 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (1994)).
12 U.S.C. § 1730(d) (1994).
238 Ga. App. at 458, 518 S.E.2d at 476.
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Lastly, plaintiff argued the evidence was insufficient to warrant
summary judgment in favor of defendant."3 In light of the affidavits
from bank personnel, the terms of the bank's customer service agreement, and the provisions of O.C.G.A. section 7-1-816, the court affirmed
the grant of summary judgment. 14 The customer service agreement
provided that each party listed on a multiparty account can conduct
transactions with respect to the account. Even assuming that agreement
did not exist, O.C.G.A. section 7-1-816 contains substantially the same
authorization. 5
The court of appeals decision in Wachovia Bank of Georgia, N.A. v.
Reynolds 6 will have a tremendous impact on the procedures financial
institutions employ in opening accounts. In Reynolds plaintiff opened a
CD for her brother at defendant bank. Plaintiff instructed defendant
that the CD was being purchased by her as attorney-in-fact for her
brother and that everything pertaining to the CD was to be sent to her
address. Although defendant did not obtain a copy of the power of
attorney, it issued plaintiff a deposit slip identifying "Bernard S. Bailey,
Jr. [brother] by Frances B. Reynolds, P.O.A. [plaintiff]" as the customer.
Nevertheless, defendant bank opened the CD in brother's name alone
and sent him all correspondence relating to the CD. Brother subsequently withdrew the funds in cash, and the cash was stolen from him.
Plaintiff sued bank on the basis it had negligently established, handled,
and redeemed the CD.' 7 A jury found for plaintiff in the amount of the
funds the bank permitted brother to withdraw and also awarded
attorney fees to plaintiff on the basis of bad faith under O.C.G.A. section
13-6-11.18
The general rule regarding a bank's duty to its customer in the context
of establishing a CD account, quoted by the court, is set forth in Thcker
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rawlins 9 as follows:
[Any financial institution which receives money from its customer in
exchange for certificate(s) of deposit has a duty to issue and/or change
the certificate in a manner that complies with the wishes of the
customer, so long as the wishes of the customer are not contrary to any
applicable law, and that the financial institution may be liable to the

13. Id. at 459, 518 S.E.2d at 476.
14. Id. at 459-60, 518 S.E.2d at 476.
15. Id.
16. 244 Ga. App. 1, 533 S.E.2d 743 (2000).
17. Id. at 1-2, 533 S.E.2d at 744.

18. Id. at 2, 533 S.E.2d at 744 (applying O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (Supp. 2000)).
19.

209 Ga. App. 649, 434 S.E.2d 94 (1993).
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customer or a third-party beneficiary for mishandling the transaction,
including improperly advising the customer how the certificate should
be 2 0established or changed to comply with the wishes of the customer.

Defendant's primary argument on appeal was that "its duty of care
extended to [brother] alone as its sole depositor-customer and the
principal for whom [plaintiff] acted as agent in establishing his CD
account." 2' Defendant supported this argument through reference to
the law of agency, which provides that a "'principal may follow his
money.' 2 Nevertheless, the court concluded plaintiff was in fact a
customer because her name as power of attorney was listed on the
"customer line" on the initial deposit slip." At this point, the court
expanded its definition of "customer," stating that even if the bank's
arguments on agency were accepted, "where one acts for another by
power of attorney suggesting possible incapacity or other special
circumstances, as here, a bank's customer must be deemed inclusive of
the depositor and the attorney-in-fact who acts as the depositor/principal's agent."24 Upon deciding plaintiff was in fact a customer,
the court concluded there was sufficient evidence, including testimony
by a bank employee that defendant bank failed to follow its own
procedures in setting up the CD and by a banking expert that defendant
violated reasonable banking practices, to support the jury's verdict.2
In the absence of clarification from the supreme court on this holding,
the account opening process just became a little more involved. Aside
from having to inquire carefully whether an account is being opened for
the benefit of an incompetent, banks will need to ensure no other
"special circumstances" exist that might establish a legal obligation on
their part to some other individual. One cannot possibly begin to
imagine the numerous "special circumstances". that, upon being
suggested to a bank official opening an account for a power of attorney,
might impose additional legal obligations upon the bank.
The court also affirmed' the award of attorney fees under O.C.G.A.
section 13-6-11.26 In particular, the court found the bank had demonstrated bad faith by failing to adhere to reasonable banking practices,

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 651, 434 S.E.2d at 96.
244 Ga. App. at 2, 533 S.E.2d at 744.
Id. at 3 n.3, 533 S.E.2d at 745 n.3 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 10-6-27 (1994)).
Id. at 3, 533 S.E.2d at 745.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 4, 533 S.E.2d at 745-46.
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (Supp. 2000).
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failing to maintain a signature card, and not sending correspondence
regarding the CD to plaintiff as specifically requested.
The holding in Family Partners Worldwide, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank,
Atlanta," in contrast to Reynolds, imposes a less stringent standard
upon banks in opening accounts in the corporate depositor context. In
Family Partners Worldwide, the chief executive officer ("CEO") of a
corporation, unbeknownst to its directors, set up a separate corporate
account for .purposes of embezzling funds. Upon learning of the
embezzlement, the corporation sued the bank on the basis of conversion.
The corporation relied on the fact that the bank neither sought nor
obtained a corporate resolution or certificate of authority from the CEO
upon setting up the embezzlement account.29
The court began its analysis by citing O.C.G.A. section 7-1-325(a),
which provides that "whenever an agent deposits money in a bank to the
credit of his principal, the bank 'shall be authorized to pay the amount
of such deposit, or any part thereof, upon the order of such agent
[properly signed] without being accountable in any way to the principal.'"' ° Ignoring questions of actual or apparent agency, the court
proceeded to determine whether the CEO had inherent agency power,
which exists when "'the power of an agent ... is derived not from
authority, apparent authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency
relation and exists for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing
with a servant or other agent."'31 Based on the following factors, the
court concluded the CEO hadinherent authority to open the account and
conduct transactions: (1) the CEO exercised undisputed, complete
executive power to run the daily affairs of the corporation; (2) he had
implied authority to execute contracts on behalf of the corporation with
access to the corporate seal; (3) he possessed complete authority to
"oversee and supervise the financial end" of the corporation; (4) he had
authority to conduct transactions in other accounts at other banks; and
(5) he had implied authority to incur and pay for reasonable business
expenses.32
Interestingly, plaintiff corporation contended defendant bank could not
rely on the CEO's inherent authority because the corporation failed to

27. 244 Ga. App. at 4-5, 533 S.E.2d at 746.
28. 242 Ga. App. 618, 530 S.E.2d 742 (2000).
29. Id. at 618, 530 S.E.2d at 743.
30. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 7-1-352(a) (1997)).
31. Id. at 619, 530 S.E.2d at 743 (quoting Trust Co. of Ga. v. Nationwide Moving &
Storage Co., 235 Ga. 224, 232, 219 S.E.2d 162, 165 (1975)).
32. Id. at 619-20, 530 S.E.2d at 743-44.
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follow its internal procedures by requiring a corporate resolution. 33 In
contrast to the holding in Reynolds, in which the defendant bank was
chastised for failure to follow its own operating procedures, the court in
Family Partners Worldwide found that "'a bank's failure to follow its
own internal operating procedures [regarding opening accounts] cannot
give rise to legal liability' for embezzlements from that account."34
Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the bank was appropriate.3"
The lesson for financial institutions from this survey period caselaw is,
thus, as follows: If failure to adhere to internal operating procedures
can be even remotely linked to a loss sustained by a customer (and good
luck in determining who exactly the customer is under Reynolds), the
law applied will depend on which appellate panel is drawn.

B.

Bank as Lender

In addition to issues of account management, several survey period
decisions addressed situations involving banks as lenders. A very
common scenario is the residential construction loan arrangement,
evidenced by a note, security deed, and construction loan agreement.
Plaintiff in Russell v. Barnett Banks, Inc.36 was such a borrower.
Under the terms of plaintiff's construction loan agreement, defendant
bank was to make periodic disbursements to plaintiff's builder upon
satisfactory inspection by the bank. Throughout construction, plaintiff
signed several modifications to the security deed, increasing the
principal amount of the loan for which the security deed was given. 7
When the bank sought to foreclose on the basis of nonpayment,
plaintiff defended on the basis that the bank breached a fiduciary duty
to him by making disbursements for faulty construction. As an initial
matter, the court noted that no confidential relationship exists between
a lender and borrower, as their interests oppose one another.39 The
court then applied principles applicable to cases in which a borrower
sues the lender for failure to notify of faulty construction." Accordingly, in the absence of "some clear promise of the lender to perform certain

33.
34.
1988),
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 620, 530 S.E.2d at 744.
Id. (citing Apcoa, Inc. v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 703 F. Supp. 1553, 1558 (N.D. Ga.
affd, 906 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Id.
241 Ga. App. 672, 527 S.E.2d 25 (1999).
Id. at 673, 527 S.E.2d at 26.
Id.
Id. at 674, 527 S.E.2d at 27.
Id.
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protective functions [and] a clear and distinct participation in the
activity which resulted in the damage" to borrower, a lender will not be
subject to claims for breach of a fiduciary duty.4'
Perhaps a more significant portion of the decision in Russell is the
court's alternative rationale for rejecting plaintiff's claims. As noted,
plaintiff signed several modification agreements of the security deed as
the principal amount of the construction loan increased. Each modification agreement contained the following clause: "'There are no defenses,
set-offs, counter claims, cross-actions or equities to or against enforcement of loan documents executed in connection with the loan."' 2 In
light of this language, plaintiff was estopped to contend otherwise.43
Counsel, then, should ensure that clients' standard form of modification
agreement contains this language. If plaintiff in Russell had survived
summary judgment by establishing a "clear promise," by providing, for
example, evidence that a loan officer gave assurances because of the
inspections being performed, this clause would have nevertheless
insulated the lender.
Often a bank or other entity extending credit will obtain a guarantee
for that debt. Subsequent conduct of the lender, however, that increases
the risk of the guarantor or exposes him to greater liability, shall
operate to discharge the guarantor.44 In Builders Development Corp.
v. Hughes Supply, Inc.,4"guarantor contended that plaintiff's extension
of credit beyond the limit requested by the principal debtor, a corporation solely owned by the guarantor, was conduct that would operate to
discharge him.46
The basis for the court's rejection of the guarantor's contention is
instructive to any attorney drafting a guarantee. In particular, the
guarantee in Builders Development stated it applied to "all sales made
by Seller to Purchaser," provided that guarantor's liability was
"UNLIMITED," and was to remain effective until the guarantor gave
written notice to cease further extensions of credit.447
In light of these
8
factors, the court affirmed the guarantor's liability.
Various documents memorializing a loan transaction-generally the
note, security instrument (whether security deed or security agreement),

41.
88, 90
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. (citing Decoudreaux v. Mutual Fed. Sav., 216 Ga. App. 503, 504-05, 455 S.E.2d
(1995)).
Id. at 675, 527 S.E.2d at 27.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 10-7-22 (1994).
242 Ga. App. 244, 529 S.E.2d 388 (2000).
Id. at 244-45, 529 S.E.2d at 389.
Id. at 245, 529 S.E.2d at 389.
Id. at 246, 529 S.E.2d at 389.

150

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

and loan agreement-can have ramifications beyond the immediate
parties of borrower and lender. In drafting these documents, one should
be careful lest an inadvertent phrase increases the universe of persons
to whom the lender shall be obligated, i.e., creation of a third-party
beneficiary. The decision in Scott v. Mamari Corp.49 is instructive on
avoiding the third-party beneficiary situation in drafting loan documentation.
In Scott defendant bank financed a real estate development with a line
of credit to the developer, which signed a note for the letter of credit.
The amount of the letter of credit was initially based upon the estimated
cost submitted to the developer by plaintiff construction company, which
was paid from the initial letter of credit on the first two of three invoices
plaintiff construction company submitted for work performed. When
project costs increased because of amounts needed for plaintiff construction company to complete its work, developer obtained an increase in the
letter of credit sufficient to cover plaintiff's additional cost and executed
a second note for these additional amounts. Subsequently, defendant
bank assigned its interests, including the loans, to defendant Mamari
("Assignee") pursuant to a written agreement that provided defendant
bank would remain responsible for funding any draws made under the
extension of the letter of credit evidenced by the second note. Defendant
bank honored its commitment when the developer submitted a draw
request, under the extended letter of credit, that payment be made
directly to the developer. The request falsely represented that plaintiff
had been paid in full. When the developer failed to pay plaintiff,
plaintiff sued defendant bank and Assignee, contending it was a thirdparty beneficiary of both the note to the bank and the agreement
between the bank and Assignee."°
The court first considered plaintiff's status as a third-party beneficiary
under the notes.5 The character of the notes primarily precluded any
finding that plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary thereunder. The
notes represented promises by the developer to the bank and imposed no
obligation on the bank to act in any way.52 The court looked solely to
the four corners of the notes and loan agreement in concluding plaintiff
was not a third-party beneficiary.53 Therefore, even though the basis
for the amount of the second note was plaintiff's estimated cost of
completion and previous payments were made jointly payable to plaintiff

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

242 Ga. App. 455, 530 S.E.2d 208 (2000).
Id. at 455-56, 530 S.E.2d at 210.
Id. at 457, 530 S.E.2d at 211.
Id.
Id.
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and developer (both of which were considerations extraneous to the note
and loan agreement), these factors were insufficient to create a thirdparty beneficiary obligation. The same was true regarding plaintiff's
assertions that all parties "knew" the purpose of the second note was to
cover plaintiff's expenses. 4
As for the bank's agreement with Assignee, pursuant to which the
bank remained responsible for funding additional draws under the
second note, the court noted that plaintiff was not mentioned anywhere
in this agreement.5" Further, the agreement did not restrict the
developer's use of any funds to be advanced under the second note, nor
did the agreement obligate the bank to disburse funds directly to
plaintiff or jointly to plaintiff and the developer.56 By employing
sufficiently general language in its documentation, the bank did not
except itself from the general rule that a "construction lender has no
duty 'to protect the subcontractors from the risk of doing business with
its borrower . . . (or) to supervise the borrower's disbursements of the

advances and control the funds for the benefit of the subcontractors."'5 7
To conclude this topic, we turn to the ongoing saga of the Sea Island
Cotton Trading Company of Statesboro, Georgia. In Strozzo v. Sea
Island Bank,58 the issue was whether the guarantor of a note, which
was given to induce issuance of a letter of credit, could peremptorily
enjoin the bank issuing the letter of credit from paying under its terms.
Hampton County Warehouse, Inc. operated a bonded warehouse in South
Carolina for handling agricultural goods; its Georgia counterpart,
Statesboro Warehouse, Inc., operated similarly in Georgia. Both were
owned by David Prosser. As a condition to obtaining licenses to operate,
both warehouses were required to obtain letters of credit payable to the
commissioners of agriculture of their respective states. Sea Island Bank,
in exchange for notes given by Prosser, issued letters of credit to the
South Carolina Department of Agriculture and the Georgia Department
of Agriculture for Hampton and Statesboro warehouses, respectively.
Prosser's notes to Sea Island Bank were guaranteed by plaintiff, Dominic
Strozzo. 9
When a farmer deposits an agricultural commodity such as cotton with
a warehouse like Hampton and Statesboro, he is supposed to receive a

54. Id. at 457-58, 530 S.E.2d at 211.
55. Id. at 458, 530 S.E.2d at 211.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 457 n.1, 530 S.E.2d at 211 n.1 (quoting Light v. Equitable Mortgage
Resources, 191 Ga. App. 816, 817, 383 S.E.2d 142, 143 (1989)).
58. 240 Ga. App. 183, 521 S.E.2d 392 (1999).
59. Id. at 183-85, 521 S.E.2d at 393-94.
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warehouse receipt, which is a negotiable instrument under Article 7 of
the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). 60 However, at the
time the events of Strozzo were unfolding, cotton trading had recently
converted to usage of electronic warehouse receipts ("EWRs"), a form of
negotiable instrument that exists only in the ether of computer circuitry
and binary code. Suffice it to say the farmers who had placed their
cotton with Hampton and Statesboro did not receive warehouse receipts
for the cotton. Hampton and Statesboro generated EWRs, the newly
created form of electronic negotiable instrument representing a right to
that cotton, which they transferred to Prosser's other company, Sea
Island Cotton Trading Co. Sea Island Cotton Trading Co. sold and
transferred the EWIRs. Then Hampton, Statesboro, Prosser, and Sea
Island Cotton Trading Co. filed bankruptcy. The farmers were not
paid.6 ' Under these facts, the reason for requiring a bond becomes
painfully obvious.
Both the Georgia and South Carolina Departments of Agriculture
called on Sea Island Bank to honor their respective letters of credit. At
this point, Strozzo, the guarantor of Prosser's notes to Sea Island Bank,
which had been given in exchange for issuance of the letters of credit,
filed suit seeking an injunction to prohibit Sea Island Bank from paying
under the letters of credit.62
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Strozzo's
injunction action.6 3 The court characterized the injunction action as an
attempt by Strozzo, as guarantor, to use his defense to the guarantee as
the basis for an injunction against transfer under the letter of credit and
thereby prevent the subsequent suit against him under the guarantee.6 4
This injunction was, in effect, an attempt "to use his legal defense in
equity to avoid a suit in law."65 The court found this tactic impermissible: "There is no equity jurisdiction where there is an adequate legal
remedy, i.e., a legal defense to a suit in law." 6 Therefore, it was
appropriate to require Sea Island Bank to honor the transfers requested
under the letters of credit. 7

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

O.C.G.A. §§ 11-7-101 to -603 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
240 Ga. App. at 185, 521 S.E.2d at 394.
Id., 521 S.E.2d at 395.
Id. at 189, 521 S.E.2d at 397.
Id. at 186, 521 S.E.2d at 395.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 188, 521 S.E.2d at 396.
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COLLECTIONS

Deficiency

A few survey decisions addressed the issue of a creditor's entitlement
to collect the deficiency upon repossession and sale of collateral. In
Jamsky v. HPSC, Inc.," the court of appeals validated a provision in
a finance lease that permitted the lessor to collect liquidated damages
on default by lessee.69 The provisions of Article 2A of the Georgia
U.C.C. apply to finance leases, including those sections that prescribe
the damages a lessor is entitled to receive upon default.7" Like most
U.C.C. provisions, however, the rules concerning damages upon default
are subject to contrary agreement between the parties." In Jamsky the
finance lease agreement provided lessor with one or more of the
following remedies upon default:
(a) We may cancel or terminate this Lease and/or any or all other
agreements that we have entered into with you;
(b) We may require you to immediately pay us, as compensation for
loss of our bargain and not as a penalty, a sum equal to (i) the present
value of all unpaid Lease Payments for the remainder of the term plus
the present value of our anticipated residual interest in the Equipment,
each discounted at a rate per year equal to the discount rate of the
Federal Bank of Boston on the date payment is demanded plus 1%,
plus (ii) all other amounts due or that become due under this Lease;
(c) We may require you to deliver the Equipment to us as set forth in

Section 3;
(d) We or our agent may peacefully repossess the Equipment without

court order and you will not make any claims against us for damages
or trespass or any other reason; and
(e) We may exercise any other right or remedy available at law or in
equity.72

In assessing the validity of the emphasized liquidated damages clause,
the court found that it "establish[ed] a reasonable estimate of probable
loss" because it "require[d] the reduction of the accelerated rent to
present value" and that the net proceeds were to be applied to the
amount owed by lessee.73 Accordingly, those drafting finance leases

68.
69.
70.
71.

238 Ga. App. 447, 519 S.E.2d 246 (1999).
Id. at 449, 519 S.E.2d at 247.
O.C.G.A. §§ 11-2A-101 to -532 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
238 Ga. App. at 448, 519 S.E.2d at 246-47.

72. Id. at 448-49, 519 S.E.2d at 247.
73. Id. at 449, 519 S.E.2d at 247.
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could utilize a similar provision with a reasonable degree of certainty
that it will be upheld in the face of any challenge by a defaulting lessee.
The court in Ali v. World Omni Financial Corp.74 reviewed the
manner in which a debtor's equity in collateral is determined, and the
decision reminded creditors of the benefit of giving proper notice of
m
resale upon repossession."
The debtor purchased a vehicle by obtaining financing from the creditor, who repossessed the car upon payment
default. When the debtor was not given notice of the vehicle's resale as
required under the finance agreement, the debtor sued' claiming as
actual damages the vehicle's market value."6 The court first stated the
method for calculating the debtor's equity in the vehicle: Deduct the
balance due on the purchase price from the market value of the
collateral.77
Because the debtor produced no evidence as to the
vehicle's market value, summary judgment in the creditor's favor was
appropriate. 8 However, the creditor's failure to give the contractually
required notice of resale
to the debtor precluded the creditor from
79
seeking a deficiency.
B.

Open Account

The survey period also produced decisions on open account. In Kent
v. Brown, ° defendant attorney engaged the services of plaintiff, an
expert in vehicle collision analysis, in relation to a personal injury suit
being handled by defendant. Defendant's client received an adverse
verdict in the personal injury case, and defendant refused to pay
plaintiff for his services. Plaintiff sued on account and obtained a jury
verdict for the value of services rendered.8 '
Defendant appealed on numerous grounds, including that several
charges given by the trial court with regard to the law of suits on open
account were invalid. 2 In rejecting all of defendant's contentions, the
court validated, in light of the evidence adduced at trial, use of the jury
charges employed. 3 Most notably, the court of appeals found the
following was a correct statement of the law as ,applied to a suit on open
account: "'If an account is rendered to the debtor on a valid contract and

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

240 Ga. App. 9, 522 S.E.2d 525 (1999).
Id. at 9, 522 S.E.2d at 525-26.
Id.
Id., 522 S.E.2d at 526.
Id.
Id. at 9-10, 522 S.E.2d at 526.
238 Ga. App. 607, 518 S.E.2d 737 (1999).
Id. at 607, 518 S.E.2d at 739.
Id. at 609, 518 S.E.2d at 740.
Id. at 610-11, 518 S.E.2d at 741.
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he fails to object to it, a jury may be authorized to infer that the failure
of the debtor to raise an objection was an implied agreement that the
account was correct.'" 4 Use of a charge like this will certainly be
useful to account creditors in the common situation in which an account
debtor simply ignores, without response, repeated invoicing by the
account creditor. The court in Kent also upheld the following charge: "If
one engages another to do work and you find it has been done or
performed and you find that the parties agreed to consideration or
compensation for that work, then the party engaging the work is, in all
[sic], liable for the agreed consideration or compensation.'" 5 The court
also upheld the use of other, related charges that an account creditor
will likely desire to employ.8 8 Counsel should refer to a full text of the
opinion in Kent in preparing requests to charge in a trial on open
account.
The decision in Mountain Bound, Inc. v. Alliant Food Service, Inc."7
highlights the pitfalls of failing to attach business records to an affidavit
in support of a suit on open account and the importance of attaching the
correct records. At issue in Mountain Bound was whether plaintiff
supplier had actually delivered goods to defendant. 8
The record
revealed an individual claiming to be defendant's president had
submitted an affidavit to the effect that "[t]he goods were not delivered
to or accepted by [defendant]." s To rebut this assertion, plaintiff
submitted the affidavit of its credit manager, which recited that attached
to it were true and accurate copies of the business records memorializing
the transaction, as well as true and accurate copies showing proof of
delivery.9 ° However, the only document attached to the credit manager's affidavit was "a computer printout of certain billings, payments,
and credits."9 This document was not proof of delivery, but only of
billing.9 2 Therefore, a jury question arose as to whether the credit
manager's affidavit was sufficient to overcome the averments that
defendant had not received the goods.9" This decision thus serves as
a reminder that counsel should emphasize to clients the necessity of
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obtaining and retaining invoices, signed by an account debtor, that
evidence delivery.
C. Miscellaneous
Garnishment issues also received treatment during the survey period.
The decision in ISP Alliance, Inc. v. Physiotherapy Associates94 serves
to assuage some uneasiness a creditor may feel in filing a garnishment.
Defendant garnishor obtained a money judgment against an individual
and filed a garnishment against the individual's employer, America Net.
A default judgment was entered against the employer in favor of
defendant when the employer failed to answer. Defendant then filed a
garnishment against the bank accounts of plaintiff corporation, which
was doing business as America Net. Garnishee bank froze plaintiff's
accounts and paid the garnished amount into the registry of the court in
which the garnishment action had been filed.95
Plaintiff sought to recover against defendant garnishor for conversion
of funds based on the freezing of its assets.96 The court rejected this on
the basis that plaintiff had failed to state a claim.9 7 "As a matter of
law, no conversion occurred in this case. The freezing of [plaintiff's]
assets was precipitated by operation of the garnishment statute, not
[defendant's] own doing." 8 A garnishing creditor, therefore, has one
less concern when proceeding with collection through garnishment of a
bank account because, as a matter of law, it will not be liable for
conversion.
During the survey period, the court of appeals also discussed the
character of evidence that the maker of a promissory note must adduce
to be entitled to receive a setoff for the amount due under the note. In
Bradford v. City of Albany,99 payee had provided the maker-contractor
with funds for work on a city project and received in exchange a
promissory note for the amount of funds advanced. After terminating
the maker-contractor, payee sued on the note. The maker-contractor set
up a defense of setoff as to the value of materials left on the construction
site.' 00
In support of his setoff defense, the maker-contractor testified he used
the loan funds to acquire various fixtures that remained on the
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construction site after his termination. However, his testimony was only
about the aggregate price paid for these items and contained no basis for
his conclusion. Because this evidence was merely an opinion, offered
without any basis for the reasoning behind the valuation and without
demonstrating an opportunity to form a correct opinion concerning the
valuation, it was without probative value. °1 Thus, the trial court was
correct in directing a verdict in payee's favor on the setoff defense." 2
As a final note on collection matters, the decision in Vandegriff v.
Hamilton0 3 reviews the manner in which a holder of a security deed
may proceed in collection of the underlying debt. Plaintiff advanced
funds to defendants and in exchange took a promissory note collateralized by a deed to secure debt. In plaintiff's suit on the note, defendants
admitted execution of the note. Defendants further stipulated that they
made no payment on the note and that they received proper notice of

default.

1
04

Defendant contended, however, that plaintiff had orally agreed to
accept a deed to the property subject to the security deed in full
satisfaction of the note."0 5 The court rejected this contention as a
defense to an action on the note: "A creditor who holds a promissory
note secured by a deed may sue upon the note, demand a deed to the
secured property, or pursue both remedies until the debt is satisfied." ' 6 Therefore, plaintiff was "entitled to elect his remedy to cure
the default."'0 7 Although the opinion is silent on the issue, plaintiff
had apparently not received a deed to the property. If a debtor is going
to give a deed in satisfaction of a note, counsel should certainly reduce
the agreement to writing and include a recital that the deed is to be
given in full satisfaction of any and all claims between the parties.
III.

PITFALLS ON THE FRONT END

Several survey period decisions underscore the need for attention to
detail in document preparation for commercial dealings, while at the
same time recognizing absolute perfection will not always be required.
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In Cohen v. Sandy Springs Crossing Associates, L.P.,"'8 the court of
appeals recognized the latter proposition. °9 Lessor faxed a guarantee
to defendant, pursuant to which defendant guarantor would guarantee
lease payments to be made by lessee. In blank spaces on the guarantee
referring to the dates of both the lease and guarantee, the guarantor
wrote, "August 15, 1994. " " ° The guarantor signed the guarantee and
returned it to the lessor. The lease was not signed, however, until
September 1, 1994. This was the only lease ever executed between
lessor and lessee, and the guarantor deposed that this was in fact the
lease he intended to guarantee."'
In lessor's subsequent action against defendant guarantor to recover
lease payments, the guarantor relied on Avec Corp. v. Schmidt,1 2 in
which the court of appeals invalidated a guarantee that referred to a
lease dated prior to the lease actually signed. 1 3 The court in Cohen
distinguished Avec Corp. by reference to other cases in which guarantees
had been upheld in similar scenarios." 4 The compelling circumstances
in Cohen were that this was the only lease ever entered between lessor
and lessee and that "the guarantor recognized his obligations under the
lease by curing the tenant's default in lease payments.""' 5 The court's
opinion in Cohen further emphasizes the significance of consistency
between the various documents executed in a lease guarantee scenario.
In describing Avec Corp., the court specifically noted that the lease and
guarantee involved in that case were "internally inconsistent."" 6
Consistency between the lease and guarantee in Cohen, other than the
dates, was certainly a principal consideration for the court's conclusion
that the guarantee was valid." 7
In Roden Electrical Supply, Inc. v. Faulkner,"8 the court demonstrated that while a discrepancy in dates is not always fatal, failure to
identify the principal debtor with precision in a guarantee is." 9 At

108. 238 Ga. App. 711, 520 S.E.2d 17 (1999).
109. Id. at 713, 520 S.E.2d at 19.
110. Id. at 711, 520 S.E.2d at 18.
111. Id.
112. 207 Ga.App. 374, 427 S.E.2d 850 (1993).
113. Id. at 376, 427 S.E.2d at 851.
114. 238 Ga. App. at 712, 520 S.E.2d at 18 (citing Town Ctr. Assoc. v. Workman, 227
Ga. App. 55, 487 S.E.2d 624 (1997) and Arnold v. Indcon, L.P., 219 Ga. App. 813, 466
S.E.2d 684 (1996)).
115. 238 Ga. App. at 712-13, 520 S.E.2d at 19.
116. Id. at 712, 520 S.E.2d at 18.
117. Id. at 713, 520 S.E.2d at 19.
118. 240 Ga. App. 556, 524 S.E.2d 247 (1999).
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issue in Faulknerwas a two-page credit application and guarantee that
purchaser had executed to obtain goods on credit from plaintiff supplier.
The first page listed purchaser as the "billable party." Page two, which
contained the language of personal guarantee and signature of the
purported guarantor, identified the principal debtor for whom the
guarantee was given as the "above business." When plaintiff sued
defendant-putative guarantor, he defended on the basis that the
guarantee was invalid for failure to comply with the statute of frauds by
not identifying the principal debtor.12 ° Notwithstanding the cross
reference on page two to the "above business," the court invalidated the
guarantee."' Form documentation should thus be reviewed to identify
a credit applicant as "principal debtor," and any guarantee language
should refer specifically by name to the debtor for whom the guarantee
is given.
The decision in United Companies Lending Corp. v. Coates'22
demonstrates the importance of ensuring that debtors to whom credit is
extended have authority to incur the debt. Grandmother devised real
property consisting of a home and lot to defendants, her two minor
grandchildren.
Defendant's mother was appointed guardian and
received letters of guardianship. The guardian obtained a loan from
plaintiff and in exchange gave a promissory note in her individual
capacity. The guardian purported to secure the note by giving a security
deed to the minors' real property. Although the guardian executed an
affidavit stating she had authority to do so, she in fact never received
probate court approval. The loan proceeds were used to satisfy an
outstanding lien on the property, to pay creditors of the guardian, and
to pay for certain improvements to the property. However, the record
suggested the prior lien on the property was similarly incurred without
authority by the guardian, and the record was also devoid as to whether
any improvements had in fact been made to the property and, if so, what
the value of these improvements was. 123 After the guardian filed
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, plaintiff lender sued the minors, "seeking
imposition of an equitable trust on property owned by the minors, a
declaration that it is subrogated to the position of a prior first lien
holder, and restitution of money that unjustly enriched the minors." 24
The court initially rejected any contention that the security deed could
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be enforced against the minors in light of O.C.G.A. section 29-2-20,
which provides as follows:
The guardian may not borrow money and bind his ward therefor nor
bind his ward's property or create any lien thereon by any contract
other than those specially allowed by law; provided however, that, upon
application in showing the need by evidence, the probate court or the
superior court may authorize a guardian to borrow money to renovate
or to make improvements upon property of his ward, or for purposes
set out in Code Sections 29-2-3 and 29-2-4.125
Nor were equitable principles of equitable trust and subrogation
available to plaintiff as these would be contrary to "the spirit and letter"
of O.C.G.A. § 29-2-20.126
The court similarly rejected unjust enrichment as a theory of
recovery. 127 To recover for unjust enrichment, a party must show the
benefit conferred was with the "'consent and approval"' of the party
receiving the benefit. 128 As the minors had not consented, this theory
failed. And even assuming the viability of an unjust enrichment cause
of action, plaintiff failed to establish any benefit to the minors.
Although the record was unclear, it appeared the prior lien, which was
discharged with loan proceeds, had similarly been invalidly obtained by
the guardian and did not predate the devise of the property to the
minors. Likewise, plaintiff failed to adduce
evidence as to the existence
129
or value of improvements to the property.
IV.

SALES OF BUSINESSES

The decision in Bell v. Sasser' highlights the pitfalls that a seller
may confront after a stock sale of a business unless the sale complies
with the provisions of the Georgia Securities Act.' 3 ' In Bell the two
owners of a closely held corporation agreed to sell all of their shares in
the corporation to another individual for $200,000. At closing, each
seller endorsed and notarized the reverse side of his share certificate and
appointed buyer as attorney-in-fact to transfer the shares on the books
of the corporation, but left the name of the transferee blank. After
closing, five persons in addition to buyer invested in the corporation; new
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certificates for buyer and the other new investors were issued; and the
seller's certificates were apparently retired. Buyer subsequently sued
seller for recovery of the purchase price.132
Buyer's cause of action was premised on O.C.G.A. section 10-5-5,'33
which makes it unlawful to sell an unregistered security, and O.C.G.A.
section 10-5-14,"3 which provides the buyer of an unregistered security
with a cause of action'to recover the purchase price from the seller.
After a lengthy analysis holding that the stock certificates at issue were
in fact "securities"135 and rejecting seller's argument that this sale of
securities was exempt from registration under O.C.G.A. section 10-59(12),"3 the court concluded summary judgment was improper because
the amount buyer was able to recover was in dispute.'3 7
The opinion completely ignored, however, the exemption from
registration provided for in O.C.G.A. section 10-5-9(13),131 which is the
exemption most commonly used by small, closely held corporations in
Georgia. The conspicuous absence of a discussion of this exemption can
only lead one to conclude the requirements of the exemption had not
been complied with. This inference emphasizes the significance for the
commercial practitioner in assuring that, when representing a seller in
a stock sale of a business, the transaction satisfies the easily met
requirements of this exemption.
Under O.C.G.A. section 10-5-9(13), the registration requirement of
O.C.G.A. section 10-5-5 does not apply to "[any transaction involving the
issuance or sale of securities of an issuer by ... an affiliate of the issuer
if all of the following conditions are met. " 1 9 First, the number of
persons in Georgia purchasing these securities must be equal to or less
than fifteen.14 ° Second, the securities cannot be offered through any
form of public advertisement.'
Third, the certificates representing
these securities must bear a statutorily prescribed legend to the effect
that they are being sold pursuant to an exemption from registration and
may not be resold without an exemption or a registration statement
being filed.'
And, fourth, each purchaser must execute a statement
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that the securities are being purchased for his or her personal investment.143 In drafting the stock sale agreement for a closely held
business entity and conducting the closing, counsel should ensure
compliance with this exemption, if available.
The decision in Bell also demonstrates why specificity in a business
sale agreement is important. The sale agreement in Bell provided
sellers would remain individually responsible for "all expenses up to
April 25, 1994." 14' After the sale was closed, questions arose as to
whether this clause covered warranty claims arising from products
manufactured before that date. 45 The court found this clause ambiguous on the issue of warranty claims
so that a jury was entitled to
46
consider conflicting parol evidence.
In Lostocco v. D'eramo,'47 the court of appeals defined the term
"federal taxes" in a settlement agreement providing for the stock sale of
a business. 41 In settlement of litigation between the two shareholders
of a corporation, plaintiff agreed to transfer all his stock in the company
to defendant, and in exchange defendant agreed to indemnify plaintiff
"from and against any liability for federal taxes arising out of [the
corporation's] operations."1 49 The indemnification agreement further
provided that there was no "agreement between the parties with respect
to any state withholding taxes, and the parties' respective rights or
liabilities concerning any state withholding taxes shall be unaffected by
this settlement agreement or the releases or covenants contained
herein." 5 °
As the court found the indemnification agreement's reference to
"federal taxes" ambiguous, the question thus became whether this
indemnity provision obligated defendant to pay "only federal corporate
income taxes owed by the corporation or ...

withholding trust fund

taxes as well as interest and penalties."' 5 ' Because the agreement was
ambiguous, the court proceeded to determine the parties' intent pursuant
to the directive contained in O.C.G.A. section 13-2-3152 and relied upon
"[aill the attendant and surrounding circumstances" to do so in
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accordance with O.C.G.A. section 13-2-2(1). 1 3 The court reasoned that
only by requiring defendant to pay withholding trust fund taxes and
penalties will plaintiff receive the benefit of the bargain struck with
defendant.15
Defendant was thus required to pay the liability for
federal trust fund taxes and penalties.155 Therefore, any asset or stock
purchase agreement, as well as any indemnification or settlement
agreement, should specify whether the term "federal taxes" includes or
excludes income taxes, trust fund taxes, penalties, interest, or any other
conceivable form of federal tax liability.
The court of appeals decision in Crews v. Roger Wahl, CPA, PC. 6
should be thoroughly reviewed by counsel for both buyer and seller in
the context of the sale of an accounting practice. On August 16, 1993,
purchaser, an accounting firm, purchased "[aill client files and contracts,
both open and closed, all client lists, both open and closed, including all
computer records (both hard copies and floppy disks) and computer
software relating thereto and all information on the computer hardware
relating thereto" from Roger Wahl, CPA, P.C. 5'
The sale was precipitated by investigation of Roger Wahl, the sole shareholder of seller, for
federal income tax evasion. On the afternoon after the sale closed, a
representative of purchaser went to the Wahl firm and announced the
transaction. David Crews, the other CPA at the Wahl firm, decided he
would start his own accounting firm with other Wahl firm employees.
Without objection from purchaser, Crews used the Wahl firm's customer
list to send a mailing stating he had started a new firm. 5 "
The Wahl firm, upon determining that certain computer hardware and
software containing customer records was missing, filed a complaint
against Crews and other employees, alleging conversion of client lists
and computer backup tapes and software. Defendants argued, however,
that because the client list was the property of the purchaser, defendants
were entitled to a directed verdict on the claim.5 9 But the court noted
that Georgia law prohibits an accountant from transferring, without
client consent, any statement, record, schedule, working paper, or
memorandum relating to that client's affairs.8 ° If the client list fell
within the meaning of this statute, then it would have been the property
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of the Wahl firm at the time it was used by defendants to send the
mailing announcing the new firm. In a case of first impression in
Georgia, the court held client lists do not fall within the meaning of the
statutory prohibition, so there was no conversion by defendant.'
However, because the backup computer tapes and software taken by
defendants may have contained confidential client information, they
were subject to O.C.G.A. section 43-3-32(a), 162 and the misappropria16 3
tion of those materials could be the basis for a conversion claim.
V.

MISCELLANEOUS

Many interesting survey cases that did not neatly fall within any one
of the foregoing headings nevertheless deserve brief mention.
The decision in Atkinson v.Cook" shows that when parties contractually agree on the procedures for providing notices under an agreement,
courts will honor that agreement. In Atkinson the parties to an option
contract for the purchase of real property agreed that, for the option to
be exercised, the grantee of the option was required to give notice by
registered mail of intent to exercise the option within a specified time
frame.165

Although the court held that notice sent by regular U.S. mail only was
not a valid exercise of this option, it qualified its holding by noting that
there was no evidence that the grantor of the option "waived his right
to demand strict compliance with the option contract's terms, or that he
learned that the option had been purportedly exercised within the option
period."' 6' In particular, the court may have reached a different result
if the grantor "had unequivocally accepted [grantee's] improper notice
within the option period, or if he had proceeded to a closing of the
contemplated transaction based on the improper notice."16' A technique to avoid situations like this one may be to include a provision that
strict compliance with the notice provision shall be required in all events
and that no waiver shall be valid unless signed in writing by the party
to whom notice is to be given.
Those attorneys who count real estate brokers among their friends and
clients may want to advise them of the decision in Brannen/Goddard
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Co. v. PNC Realty Holding Co. of Georgia.'68 Plaintiff broker obtained
a tenant for the owner of commercial property. A commission agreement
between the broker and owner stated that the owner would pay
commissions to the broker during the lease and during any modification,
extension, or renewal of the lease by the tenant. A new lease agreement,
subsequently entered between owner and tenant, contained a recital that
the owner agreed to pay any commissions to the broker. The owner then
transferred the property to defendant and, in a lease assignment
agreement, assigned its interest in the lease to defendant. However, the
lease assignment recited that defendant would not be responsible for any
liability69 or obligation arising under the lease prior to the assignment. 1

The broker sued defendant to recover commissions, but the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
defendant. 7 ° In particular, the court held the original commission
agreement, apparently a document separate from the initial lease itself,
was a personal covenant not running with the land.'7 ' In addition, the
lease assignment's exclusion of pre-assignment obligations was valid.
This conclusion was not altered by the fact the renewed lease contained
a provision obligating owner to pay commissions because this provision
to
did not recite that commissions were in fact due and did not refer
172
obligations under the original, extraneous commission agreement.
What can you advise a broker to do to insulate himself or herself from
the result in Brannen/GoddardCo.? To the extent a broker has any
input in drafting a lease agreement in which the broker is to continue
to receive commissions throughout the lease term, he should request a
provision that incorporates by reference both the terms of any extraneous listing agreement and the material provisions of the listing
agreement, including any ongoing obligation for payment of commissions.
A broker may also try to request a clause stating that commission
obligations under the lease shall be binding on any subsequent assignee,
notwithstanding language to the contrary in an assignment of the lease.
Lastly, if the broker is adventurous, he may request a clause that the
obligation to pay commissions is one that runs with the land.
Finally, a survey period decision that may be of interest to commercial
practitioners whose practice includes residential home closings is Haynes

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

238 Ga. App. 387, 519 S.E.2d 35 (1999).
Id. at 387-88, 519 S.E.2d at 35-36.
Id. at 390, 519 S.E.2d at 37.
Id. at 389, 519 S.E.2d at 36.
Id., 519 S.E.2d at 36-37.

166

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

v. Fincher."' In Haynes the court considered the enforceability of an
arbitration clause in a home warranty issued by plaintiff's home
builder.174 Plaintiff home buyers contended that, under O.C.G.A.
section 9-9-2(c)(8),' 75 their failure to initial the arbitration clause in
the home warranty precluded its enforceability. 76 The court of
appeals disagreed,77stating that code provision only applies to home sale
or loan contracts.1
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